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SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES OF THE HAITI
EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE: THE EXPERIENCE OF USAID
Paul E. Weisenfeld∗
INTRODUCTION
Immediately after a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti on January 12,
2010, the international community commenced an unprecedented relief effort
for what was the worst recorded natural disaster in the Western Hemisphere.1
The U.S. Agency for International Development (“USAID”) led the American
response to the emergency, coordinating the efforts of multiple U.S.
Government (“USG”) agencies and laying the groundwork for reconstruction
and long-term development. The USG was part of a larger international
response, which saw as many as 129 countries send personnel and supplies2
and the United Nations (“UN”) provide robust leadership. As was immediately
apparent to those engaged in the response, post-earthquake Haiti was a
complicated working environment, requiring innovative approaches in both
coordination and response mechanisms.
Haiti’s pre-earthquake conditions—principally, high levels of extreme
poverty and weak institutions of governance—were contributing factors to the
massive loss of life and wide-scale destruction of infrastructure.3 The

∗ Assistant to the Administrator, Bureau for Food Security, U.S. Agency for International Development,
and formerly Coordinator of USAID’s Haiti Task Team, where he was responsible for overseeing relief and
reconstruction efforts from Washington following Haiti’s January 12, 2010 earthquake. This Article was
prepared for the Emory International Law Review Symposium held on January 27, 2011, entitled, “A
Worldwide Response: Examining International Law Frameworks in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters.” The
Author would like to thank Sara Lockwood and Jayanthi Narain for their invaluable assistance in preparing
this Article.
1 Ryan M. Walk et al., Three Phases of Disaster Relief in Haiti—Pediatric Surgical Care on Board the
United States Naval Ship Comfort, 46 J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 1978, 1978 (2011).
2 See FIN. TRACKING SERV., UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN
AFFAIRS, HAITI: EARTHQUAKES: JANUARY 2010 (2011), available at http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_
R10_E15797_asof-1103301306.pdf.
3 See Engineer: Tough Japanese Building Codes Worked, CBS NEWS (Mar. 12, 2011, 11:42 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/03/12/earlyshow/saturday/main20042459.shtml; Melissa Lafsky, The
Power of Building Codes: Chile Death Toll Less than 1% That of Haiti, INFRASTRUCTURIST (Mar. 1, 2010),
http://www.infrastructurist.com/2010/03/01/the-power-of-building-codes-chile-death-toll-less-than-1-that-ofhaiti. Historical precedent has shown—most recently in Chile and Japan—that in nations where citizens can
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earthquake’s impact compounded Haiti’s preexisting conditions,
nearly impossible in many cases to disaggregate the causes of
human suffering in and around the capital, Port-au-Prince. These
will continue to be major factors impeding recovery and
reconstruction efforts for many years to come.

[Vol. 25

making it
immediate
conditions
long-term

The unparalleled surge of civilian and military personnel from many
nations saved an indeterminable number of lives and stabilized the situation in
terms of health, security, and immediate protection of the displaced from the
elements. This Article focuses on the U.S.-led response, which demonstrated
how present laws and practices are effective in responding to highly complex
and large-scale natural disasters and highlighted potential areas for
improvement.
This Article discusses areas where greater efficiencies can be achieved.
There is a need for systems and procedures to clarify roles and responsibilities
among the different agencies when a major disaster requires a significant surge
of personnel in a whole-of-government approach. There is also a need to move
toward standardization of data collection and analysis across the various
humanitarian actors to facilitate rapid identification of gaps. This Article also
discusses some of the critical challenges moving forward, as the USG works
alongside the Government of Haiti (“GOH”) and the international community
to help Haiti advance beyond its pre-earthquake development level. These
include understanding the complexities of Haiti’s land tenure system, so that
rubble can be removed and new construction can begin; addressing the urgent
needs of vulnerable populations, particularly internally displaced persons
(“IDPs”); understanding and programming resources to address gender-based
violence (“GBV”); and working with the international community to ensure a
smooth transition from relief to reconstruction.
The Haiti relief and reconstruction effort continues to be complex,
presenting the difficult task of allocating limited human and financial resources
between immediate humanitarian needs and long-term sustainable
development solutions, which are intended to address Haiti’s underlying
problems. The ultimate measure of success for the relief and reconstruction
effort will be the strength of Haitian institutions that the USG and international
community leave behind.

afford higher-quality housing and government can enforce stronger building codes, major disasters result in
significantly less loss of life. See Engineer: Tough Japanese Building Codes Worked, supra; Lafsky, supra.
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I. THE EARTHQUAKE: COMPOUNDING EXISTING DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES
Understanding Haiti’s pre-earthquake environment is critical to a full
appreciation of the current reconstruction challenges. Haiti faced deep
development challenges that were compounded when the country was hit by
the second-most deadly earthquake on record.4 On the morning of January 12,
2010, Haiti already was statistically the poorest in the Western Hemisphere,
ranking 149 out of the 177 countries on the UN Human Development Index.5
This was well behind the Dominican Republic, which shares the island of
Hispaniola with Haiti but ranked 90 on the Human Development Index.6 The
Haitian people endured poverty, malnourishment, and widespread
unemployment: seventy-eight percent lived on less than $2 a day;7 more than
one in five children were chronically undernourished;8 and up to eighty percent
of the population was unemployed or working in the informal sector, which is
not taxed or monitored by the government.9 In addition, fifty-two percent of
the approximately 10 million Haitians lived in urban areas, which were
overcrowded and lacked opportunity.10
The earthquake was the strongest to hit the island in 200 years,11 causing a
humanitarian crisis on a scale that had never been seen before in the Western
Hemisphere: killing approximately 316,000 people;12 leaving more than 1.5

4

Earthquakes with 50,000 or More Deaths, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., http://earthquake.usgs.gov/
earthquakes/world/most_destructive.php (last updated Apr. 14, 2011, 4:24 PM) (listing earthquakes by number
of deaths).
5 UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2009: OVERCOMING BARRIERS:
HUMAN MOBILITY AND DEVELOPMENT 145 (2009), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_
Complete.pdf (ranking countries by overall human development at the end of 2009).
6 Id. at 144.
7 DEV. DATA GRP., WORLD BANK, HAITI AT A GLANCE 1 (2006), available at http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTHAITI/Resources/Haiti.AAG.pdf (estimates for the period 2000–2005).
8 4 MICHEL CAYMITTES ET AL., MINISTERE DE LA SANTÉ PUBLIQUE ET DE LA POPULATION, INSTITUT
HAÏTIAN DE L’ENFANCE & MACRO INT’L INC., ENQUÊTE MORTALITÉ, MORBIDITÉ ET UTILISATION DES
SERVICES [SURVEY OF MORTALITY, MORBIDITY, AND UTILIZATION OF SERVICES] 264 (2007), available at
http://www.measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR192/FR192.pdf (data for the period 2005–2006).
9 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., HAITI COUNTRY PROFILE 1 (2009), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/
pdf_docs/PDACN932.pdf.
10 See The World Factbook: Haiti, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/ha.html (last updated Nov. 10, 2011) (data for 2010).
11 Ker Than, Haiti Earthquake “Strange,” Strongest in 200 Years, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 13, 2010),
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/01/100113-haiti-earthquake-red-cross.
12 Haiti Quake Death Toll Rises to 230,000, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8507531.stm (last updated
Feb. 11, 2010, 2:25 PM). Death estimates vary. See, e.g., Earthquakes with 50,000 or More Deaths, supra note
4 (claiming 316,000 deaths).
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million Haitians to live in spontaneous settlements;13 destroying infrastructure;
and generating about 10 million cubic meters of rubble.14 The scale of the
devastation, which was in large part due to Haiti’s preexisting poverty,
significantly exacerbated Haiti’s problems. In a real sense, the 2010 Haiti
earthquake is an enormous tragedy layered upon an already existing tragedy, in
many cases making it nearly impossible to disaggregate whether current
suffering (e.g., morbidity, homelessness, unemployment) is due to the
earthquake or pre-earthquake factors.
II. USG RESPONSE: ASSESSING THE WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT EFFORT
Recognizing the enormity of the earthquake’s impact, President
Barack Obama ordered a “swift, coordinated, and aggressive” USG response,
led by USAID.15 This response would align with the GOH’s plan for recovery
and reconstruction and work alongside the international community to achieve
lasting development gains. Now that more than a year has passed, observers
have been engaged in a major analytical effort to take stock of the international
response. The debate among many seems to focus on whether the glass is half
full or half empty.16 Without question, an enormous effort lays ahead. It should
not be a surprise, therefore, that in the poorest country in the hemisphere, hit
by the most devastating disaster in the hemisphere’s history, it is easy enough
to find numerous areas for improvement that would justify a glass-half-empty
perspective. For those working in development, however, it is equally critical
to identify successes that can serve to motivate efforts and that we can build
upon. This Part sums up some of those USG successes.
The USG’s whole-of-government response saved lives and provided
critical help for millions of affected Haitians, beginning immediately after the
quake. Within twenty-four hours, a USAID Disaster Assistance Response
Team was on the ground providing logistical and material support, and the

13 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., HAITI—EARTHQUAKE: FACT SHEET #61, at 1 (2010), http://www.usaid.
gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/haiti/template/fs_sr/fy2010/haiti_eq_fs61
_07-02-2010.pdf.
14 COMMISSION INTÉRIMAIRE POUR LA RECONSTRUCTION D’HAÏTI, SITUATION ANALYSIS, CALL FOR
PROPOSALS, AND REQUEST FOR FUNDING 1 (2011), available at http://en.cirh.ht/files/pdf/call_for_proposals/
cirh_rfp2011_debrisremoval_08-10_en.pdf.
15 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Rescue Efforts in Haiti (Jan 13, 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-rescue-efforts-haiti.
16 See Tim Padgett, Haiti’s Quake, One Year Later: It’s the Rubble, Stupid!, TIME (Jan. 12, 2011),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2041877,00.html.

WEISENFELD GALLEYSFINAL2.DOC

2011]

3/20/2012 1:52 PM

SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES OF HAITI EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE

1101

American commitment did not stop there.17 USAID participated in the largest
emergency urban food distribution ever, which fed more than 4 million
people.18 USAID also supported the delivery of emergency shelter to victims at
an unprecedented rate, providing 1.5 million people with basic shelter
materials before the rainy season.19 Medical teams from the Department of
Health and Human Services treated more than 30,000 patients and performed
hundreds of surgeries.20 Urban search-and-rescue teams from USAID and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency took part in history’s most successful
international rescue effort, which saved more than 130 people.21
The USG also helped find solutions where infrastructure was destroyed by
the earthquake. Through the U.S. Southern Command, the U.S. Navy deployed
ships and helicopters to Haitian waters to allow relief workers access to people
who could not be reached because of roads blocked with debris.22 The U.S.
Coast Guard worked with the GOH to restore operations to the port and
coordinate harbor traffic for the international relief effort;23 the USG also
restored the airport to operations, despite damage that made the control tower
and terminal useless.24
The USG and international efforts extended beyond immediate relief and
recovery. Over the past year, the USG made progress in laying the groundwork
for significant development gains. For example, the USG, with funding from
the World Bank, has implemented an advanced imaging system with the help
of Rochester Institute of Technology scientists to survey the damage in Haiti
and provide images and data to those working on the ground.25 To date, teams
of engineers have assessed more than 400,000 buildings, and more than fifty
percent of these have been classified as “green,” or safe for occupancy,

17 Angela Rucker, Faced with Destruction, Earthquake Responders Address Immediate Suffering,
USAID (Feb./Mar. 2011), http://www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_feb11/FL_feb11_HTresp.html.
18 See Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, U.S. Dep’t of State, Haiti: One Year Later, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.state.gov/s/hsc/rls/154255.htm [hereinafter Haiti: One Year Later].
19 See id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Mike Mount & Larry Shaughnessy, First U.S. Military Aid Reaches Quake-Stricken Haiti, CNN (Jan.
13, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-13/us/haiti.us.coast.guard.
23 Press Release, U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Continues Support in Wake of Haiti Earthquake (Jan.
13, 2010), https://www.piersystem.com/go/doc/786/452059.
24 See Nathan D. Broshear, Haiti Airport Transitions, Commercial Flights Begin, U.S. AIR FORCE (Feb.
25, 2010), http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123191523.
25 Lidar Images Haiti Disaster, PHOTONICS.COM (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.photonics.com/Article.
aspx?AID=40852.

WEISENFELD GALLEYSFINAL2.DOC

1102

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

3/20/2012 1:52 PM

[Vol. 25

allowing IDPs to return to their homes with confidence that they will be safe.26
Those classified as “yellow” can be made safe with relatively minor repairs,
which are currently underway.27 USAID is also working to build transitional
shelters (“t-shelters”), small structures that can last up to three years and will
provide safer shelter until long-term solutions can be developed.28 To date,
USAID has provided more than 25,600 t-shelters, sufficient to house more than
128,000 people and about thirty-five percent of the international total of more
than 73,700 t-shelters.29 USAID assessment and construction programs
incorporate a training element that provides Haitians with critical engineering
and construction skills.30 These skills allow Haitian engineers and construction
workers to participate in their country’s development.31
In addition to rebuilding what was destroyed by the earthquake, the USG is
working with the people and government of Haiti to prevent or mitigate future
disasters. To help guard against the very real threat of disease outbreak,
particularly in spontaneous settlements for displaced Haitians, USAID worked
with the GOH and international community to immunize more than a million
Haitians against contagious diseases ranging from polio to diphtheria.32
Because hurricanes frequently wreak havoc on Haiti, the USG undertook
measures such as slope stabilization and canal clearance to mitigate the
damage and loss of life that flooding can cause; as a result of these efforts,
November 2010’s Hurricane Tomas caused significantly less damage and loss
of life (twenty-one dead) than have other hurricanes (more than 1,000 people
killed in Haiti from tropical storms in 2008).33 To help Haiti grow its capacity
to feed itself, the USG moved aggressively to support planting, while scaling
down general food distribution. A collaborative campaign between USAID and
the GOH Ministry of Agriculture “helped more than 10,000 farmers double the

26

Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, U.S. Dep’t of State, Shelter Solutions: Fast Facts on the U.S.
Government’s Work in Haiti, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (July 15, 2011), http://www.state.gov/s/hsc/rls/168715.htm.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See id.
31 Jessica Desvarieux, Task of Rebuilding Haiti Expected To Be Ambitious, Arduous, CNN (Jan. 30,
2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-30/world/haiti.construction_1_haiti-international-aid-usaid.
32 Office of the Haiti Special Coordinator, U.S. Dep’t of State, Fast Fact on U.S. Government’s Work in
Haiti, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 8, 2011), http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2011/154144.htm.
33 Paul Weisenfeld, Senior Deputy Assistant Adm’r, Latin American & Caribbean Bureau, U.S. Agency
for Int’l Dev., Using Lessons from Earthquakes in Haiti and Chile to Reduce Global Risk, Speech Given at the
National Academics Disasters Roundtable Workshop (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_
america_caribbean/modules/whatsnew/national_acadamies_speech.html.
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yields of staples like corn, beans, and sorghum in 2010.”34 These and similar
programs were made possible by USAID’s legal mandate as the principal
development agency of the USG: promoting economic and social development
abroad.
III. USAID’S MANDATE: PROMOTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
ABROAD
USAID’s mandate originates from the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
enacted by Congress in recognition that prosperity and stability abroad can
serve the American security and economic interests at home. In critical part,
that legislation provides:
The Congress declares that the individual liberties, economic
prosperity, and security of the people of the United States are best
sustained and enhanced in a community of nations which respect
individual civil and economic rights and freedoms and which work
together to use wisely the world’s limited resources in an open and
equitable international economic system. Furthermore, the Congress
reaffirms the traditional humanitarian ideals of the American people
and renews its commitment to assist people in developing countries
to eliminate hunger, poverty, illness, and ignorance.
Therefore, the Congress declares that a principal objective of the
foreign policy of the United States is the encouragement and
sustained support of the people of developing countries in their
efforts to acquire the knowledge and resources essential to
development and to build the economic, political, and social
35
institutions which will improve the quality of their lives.

Under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act, President Bill Clinton
designated the USAID Administrator as the Special Coordinator for
International Disaster Assistance.36 This gives USAID—particularly the Office
of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (“OFDA”)—the mandate to save lives,
alleviate suffering, and reduce the economic impact of disasters.

34 Haiti: A Shared Commitment One Year Later, IMPACT (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.usaid.gov/
newsletter/2011/impact0113.html.
35 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 101(a), 22 U.S.C. § 2151(a) (2006).
36 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., AUTOMATED DIRECTIVES SYSTEM ch. 251, § 251.1(3) (2011), available
at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/251.pdf.
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This mandate, as codified in Title 22, Section 2292 of the U.S. Code, gives
the President and, through his delegation of authority, USAID very broad legal
authority for disaster response:
Subject to limitations in section 2292a of this title, and
notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter or any other Act,
the President is authorized to furnish assistance to any foreign
country, international organization, or private voluntary organization,
on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for international
disaster relief and rehabilitation, including assistance relating to
disaster preparedness, and to the prediction of, and contingency
37
planning for, natural disasters abroad.

Through this extensive authority granted by Congress, USAID is able to
determine the best way to conduct relief and development assistance, and the
terms and conditions of such assistance, notwithstanding any other provision of
law. The legal authority accorded by this congressional authority is flexible
and, therefore, extremely useful, as it allows USAID to meet disaster relief
needs identified by USAID teams in the field, partners, and others with firsthand knowledge of the situation on the ground. USAID uses this authority to
provide assistance through grants and cooperative agreements to NGOs and
public international organizations, some contractors, and interagency
agreements with other USG agencies; most of these awards are monetary,
although some awards by USAID’s Office of Food for Peace and the Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance are in-kind.38
Through this authority, USAID has been able to leverage the considerable
resources of the USG in the Haitian earthquake response. Due to the magnitude
of the disaster, particularly in the early response, USAID needed to draw on
the capacities of other USG departments and agencies to a greater extent than
has historically been the case with international disaster relief. For example,
through an interagency agreement with the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, USAID sent medical teams to provide immediate assistance
for the first months following the disaster.39 Generally, this assistance would
have been provided through USAID’s NGO partners and the public

37

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 491(b), 22 U.S.C. § 2292(b) (2006).
See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., AUTOMATED DIRECTIVES SYSTEM ch. 303, § 303.3.3 (2011),
available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/303.pdf; What Is Food for Peace?, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L
DEV., http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/ffp (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
39 See Ben Barber, Frontline: Aid Experts End Haiti Quake Chaos, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (Mar.
2010), http://www.usaid.gov/press/frontlines/fl_mar10/p01_haiti100301.html.
38
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international organizations with which USAID works.40 USAID entered into
multiple interagency agreements with a variety of other agencies, including the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Centers for Disease Control, the
Peace Corps, and the Department of Defense (“DOD”), to ensure a robust
humanitarian response.41
IV. PRELIMINARY LESSONS FROM THE HAITI EXPERIENCE
Under the authority of the Foreign Assistance Act, USAID has been
working around the world for the past fifty years, responding to disasters and
developing solutions to long-standing economic and social challenges. The
agency is applying lessons from earlier global experiences to the situation in
Haiti and learning from the relief effort in Haiti, so that the next response can
be more streamlined, better coordinated, and even more effective.
A principal lesson from the Haiti earthquake response is that, because the
international community does not maintain the capacity to respond to a disaster
on the order of magnitude of the Haiti earthquake, systems to surge resources
must be institutionalized. While the USG’s whole-of-government effort saw
significant success, the systems and procedures for coordination were devised
while actors managed the on-the-ground response,42 requiring the attention of
both senior officials and staff in the field. These improvisations included
developing protocols for the exchange of staff between agencies, managing the
transfer of budgetary authorities, and setting up systems for communication
and sharing of information among agencies. Thus, developing coordination
systems and procedures that codify relative roles and responsibilities of various
agencies in the event a major surge is needed will facilitate a smoother
response and enable staff to focus their energies on responding to the most
important and urgent needs in the field. This is not an issue of the authority to
act, but rather, a question of what structures are needed to promote effective
coordination.

40 See Health: Partnerships, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/
global_health/home/Partnerships/index.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
41 See, e.g., USAID—DoD Personnel Exchange, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., http://www.usaid.gov/
our_work/global_partnerships/ma/sdos.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
42 See Chris Dolmetsch, UN Urges Haiti Coordination as Supplies Flood Airport (Update 1),
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2010, 5:53 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
a66Yi1lfcL.Y.
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A particularly important partner for USAID in major relief operations is the
DOD. In a disaster such as the Haiti earthquake, where critical infrastructure
(air and sea ports, and roads) was damaged, normal commercial avenues for
moving large amounts of humanitarian commodities could not be relied
upon.43 In such situations, the unmatched logistical capacities of the U.S.
military are vital to saving lives. DOD’s capability to deploy air and sea lift
assets rapidly, including to remote areas with minimally functioning
infrastructure, were crucial in post-earthquake Haiti to accessing vulnerable
populations. DOD policy specifically recognizes the importance of its role in
complex emergencies, noting that “[t]he Department of Defense shall be
prepared to . . . [s]upport stability operations activities led by other U.S.
Government departments or agencies[,] . . . foreign governments and security
forces, international governmental organizations, or when otherwise
directed.”44 The nature of the U.S. military as an important asset in disaster
relief and humanitarian assistance requires ongoing civilian–military
cooperation. DOD policy also emphasizes the need for “[i]ntegrated civilian
and military efforts.”45 For the past several years, USAID and DOD have
engaged in staff exchanges that resulted in preexisting, well-established
relationships that facilitated cooperation.46 Key issues related to the
involvement of DOD, such as defining the scope of the military’s role and
specifying the conditions for drawdown and eventual withdrawal of military
assets, can be more easily agreed upon when there is an ongoing relationship.
An important aspect of interagency coordination is determining whether
other USG agencies have the adequate legal authority to act and expend
resources internationally. While an agency, such as the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, has the capacity and resources to act quickly and
provide funds for domestic emergencies, it has limited authority to respond to
international crises.47 In such cases, USAID can use its broad legal authority to
43 See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., HAITI—EARTHQUAKE: FACT SHEET #9, at 2 (2010), http://www.
usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/haiti/template/fs_sr/fy2011/haiti_eq
_fs09_01-06-2011.pdf; Tom Leonard, Haiti Earthquake: Damaged Port Reopens To Aid Ships, TELEGRAPH
(Jan. 20, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamericaandthecaribbean/haiti/
7032385/Haiti-earthquake-damaged-port-reopens-to-aid-ships.html.
44 DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NUMBER 3000.05: STABILITY OPERATIONS 2 (2009), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf.
45 Id. at 2–3.
46 See USAID—DoD Personnel Exchange, supra note 41.
47 See Maria E. Bovill, Redefining HHS International Response: Challenges and Recommendations for
Interagency Partnerships 1–3 (2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=
GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA510888.
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provide an umbrella for other agencies through the use of interagency
agreements, essentially permitting them to act in an international environment
using the budget and legal authorities of USAID.
Another key lesson from Haiti revolves around the gathering and use of
data. Some groups monitor the quality of aid and its impact, so that
adjustments can be made as necessary.48 Perhaps even more important in the
immediate aftermath of a disaster is the need to collect data on conditions on
the ground so that aid can be targeted where it is most needed. For example, is
potable water more available in one neighborhood versus others, leading to
differences in health outcomes? During the immediate Haiti response,
international donors and numerous NGOs expended an enormous amount of
time amassing data on humanitarian conditions (e.g., food security, health,
availability of shelter) with the primary purposes of identifying critical gaps
and monitoring progress.49 Many of these humanitarian actors, however,
developed their own methodologies and reporting tools, making it difficult to
aggregate data and see a comprehensive picture of the needs.50 The UN, which
manages the international donor–NGO coordination system in post-disaster
situations, known as the “Cluster System,”51 worked hard to gather data from
organizations operating in Haiti to put together the full pictures of activities
and needs, but they were hampered by inconsistencies in methodologies and
tools.52 An additional challenge was that a number of small NGOs operating in
remote areas failed to coordinate with other NGOs, resulting in incomplete
information.53 At the end of the day, many groups were expending significant
energy collecting and reporting large amounts of data—often duplicative—
without being able to develop a useful tool to monitor progress and track
assistance. In essence, there was both too much and too little data.
48 See Georgianne Nienaber, Haiti Still Buried Under the Rubble of Dueling NGOs: OXFAM Report,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2011, 12:06 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/georgianne-nienaber/haiti-still-

buried-under-_b_805839.html.
49

See KERREN HEDLUND, INT’L COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES, STRENGTH IN NUMBERS: A REVIEW
http://www.icva.ch/doc00004599.pdf.
in Haiti: Aid Groups’ Effectiveness Questioned
amid Complaints About Poor Coordination, High Turnover, Lack of Transparency, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2011,
at A6.
51 Maura R. O’Connor, Does International Aid Keep Haiti Poor?, SLATE (Jan. 7, 2011, 7:11 AM), http://
www.slate.com/id/2279858/entry/2279857.
52 See Colum Lynch, U.N. Aid Coordinator ‘Disappointed’ with Haiti Relief Efforts, WASH. POST, Feb.
18, 2010, at A8.
53 See Matthew Bolton, Human Security After State Collapse: Global Governance in Post-earthquake
Haiti 18 (London Sch. of Econ., Research Paper RP 01/2011, 2011), available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/
32167/1/After%20State%20Collapse%20Haiti%20Glob%20Gov%20Paper%20Revisedx.pdf.
OF NGO COORDINATION IN THE FIELD 3–9 (2010), available at
50 See William Booth, International Charities Fall Short
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Given the explosion of international actors, achieving standardization on
reporting will be a challenge, and even more so in large, complex emergencies.
In future disasters, it will be important to dedicate and deploy staff charged
exclusively with the collection, standardization, and compilation of data. It
would be useful for the United States to work with other major donors and
NGOs to develop standard methodologies and reporting tools, encourage all
humanitarian actors to comply, and use the information generated to satisfy
both the operational needs of the on-ground response, as well as the strategic
information needs of Washington and the media. Agreed-upon tools could
include standardized questionnaires, indicators, and reporting templates.
Although obtaining a uniform commitment from the wide variety of donors
will be difficult, the upsides are enormous in terms of more effective
management of humanitarian crises.
V. CHALLENGES: OVERCOMING ROADBLOCKS TO LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT
In addition to response coordination challenges, the international
community faces a number of difficult on-the-ground challenges to
reconstruction in Haiti. The USG is working with the people and government
of Haiti to develop infrastructure, promote economic growth, improve the
health system, and strengthen democracy and governance.54 The USG must
address issues of land tenure, the needs and rights of IDPs, the continuing
problem of GBV, and the need to manage a smooth transition from relief to
reconstruction. Addressing each of these will help ensure that USG
development interventions have a long-term, positive impact on Haiti.
Strengthening Haitian institutions and ensuring Haitian ownership as we
jointly address these challenges will be fundamental to achieving sustainable
outcomes.
A. Land Tenure
Land tenure, the way land is held or owned by individuals and groups, is a
complex issue in most lesser-developed countries. The challenge of
establishing who owns what land is particularly difficult in post-earthquake
Haiti, where informal agreements are rife, there are extremely high rates of
tenancy, there are frequently multiple claims on a single parcel (from

54 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES: HAITI 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter
OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES: HAITI], available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/haiti3/rpt0611.pdf.
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purported landowners, owners of a house, and tenants), and even formal
agreements are plagued by incomplete or unclear land records.55 Today, the
GOH and international community are faced with the challenge of resettling
the 680,000 Haitians still living in spontaneous settlements.56 With the benefits
of secure land title widely accepted among the international donor
community,57 USAID and other donors are eager to facilitate resettlement of
IDPs onto property with clear title.58 The urgency of resettling IDPs on
humanitarian grounds, however, means that international donors cannot wait to
fix Haiti’s complex land system and are turning to methods like communitybased enumeration, a participatory “data gathering process which is to a
significant extent jointly designed and conducted by the people who are being
surveyed,”59 and decentralization to ensure that long-term solutions are found
for longstanding land tenure and overcrowding issues.60
According to the UN Human Settlements Programme (“UN-HABITAT”),
“[f]ormal systems favour written evidence, but more attention can be given to
oral evidence in certain circumstances, such as after a disaster or conflict, for
areas dominated by customary systems, or during the process of formalizing
informal settlements.”61 Community-based enumeration has been used around
the world, including post-tsunami Aceh, which saw the need for the
establishment of land records after villages were completely destroyed or
washed away in the disaster.62 Although the process has associated challenges,
including the need to standardize methods, reconciling data derived from
community-based enumeration with official data, and the need for a clear legal
mandate, UN-HABITAT notes that, in Aceh, community-based enumeration
“brought the community together to work on the future. This was very

55 UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, COUNT ME IN: SURVEYING FOR TENURE
SECURITY AND URBAN LAND MANAGEMENT 7 (2010), available at www.unhabitat.org/pmss/
getElectronicVersion.aspx?nr=2975&alt=1.
56 See Press Release, Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, Haiti’s Camp Population Still Falling, but
Great Challenges Remain (Mar. 18, 2011), http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/press-and-media/press-releases/
camp-population-falling-challenges-remain.
57 See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND
FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 63–64 (2000) (noting that secure tenure improves access to credit and encourages
greater investment in property).
58 See USAID Post-earthquake Response: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV.,
http://www.usaid.gov/ht/faq.html (last updated Dec. 2010).
59 UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, supra note 55, at 7.
60 See id. at 110.
61 Id. at 78.
62 Id. at 79.
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important after so much was disrupted by the tsunami. The strengthened
community still continues to be engaged in other activities.”63
Through community-based enumeration, USAID and its partners are
working with local people to reach agreement within their communities on
whom they acknowledge as having the right of occupancy for each parcel or
structure, emphasizing the most vulnerable families such as the disabled and
women-headed households.64 At the same time, USAID and its partners are
giving renters vouchers that must be used on rent and repair, rather than giving
funding directly to landlords who may attempt to lease their buildings to nonIDP families at higher rates.65 Thus, before USAID or its partners will fund a
repair, not only must the community agree on which family should return to
the property, but the landlord, if any, must also agree.66 This detailed process,
which is necessary to ensure that resources are focused on those most in need,
can consume time and slow down recovery efforts.
B. Internally Displaced Persons
The target beneficiaries of USAID’s land tenure efforts are largely Haitian
IDPs. IDPs are a special classification of vulnerable people—those who do not
cross an international border, but are forced from their homes.67 According to
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees:
Even if they have fled for similar reasons as refugees (armed conflict,
generalized violence, human rights violations), IDPs legally remain
under the protection of their own government—even though that
government might be the cause of their flight. As citizens, they retain
all of their rights and protection under both human rights and
68
international humanitarian law.

63

Id. at 82–83.
Id. at 52.
65 INT’L HOUSING COAL., U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., HAITI SHELTER SECTOR ASSESSMENT: ONE
YEAR AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE 63 (2011), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADU885.pdf. Rents
in Haiti are considerably higher post-earthquake; this is not surprising given the dramatic reduction in supply
of rental properties caused by the earthquake. See id. at 63.
66 Id.; UNITED NATIONS HUMAN SETTLEMENTS PROGRAMME, supra note 55, at 44–49.
67 Internally Displaced People: On the Run in Their Own Land, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR
REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
68 Id.
64
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Amnesty International estimates that there are almost twice as many IDPs
worldwide as refugees: approximately 24.5 million IDPs, compared to 14.2
million refugees.69
USAID recognizes that IDPs are among the most vulnerable people in the
world. The USAID Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons Policy70 affirms
this and encourages wider international recognition of the UN’s Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement as a useful framework.71 Many of these
principles relate to specific protections for those displaced by violence,
politics, or conflict—such as the right to protection from combat or forced
labor—and challenges can arise when applying and meeting them, particularly
when a country lacks capacity or will to carry them out.72 Because the
earthquake in Haiti initially displaced 1.5 million people, and 680,000 remain
in spontaneous settlements,73 many of these principles are applicable to the
Haitian situation. Some principles to highlight include: equal rights; the
responsibility of the government to provide protection and assistance; the right
of the displaced to request and receive assistance and protection without
punishment; the right of vulnerable IDPs, including children, mothers with
children, persons with disabilities, and the elderly, to receive protection,
assistance, and treatment; protection against violence, including GBV, and
slavery; the right to move freely about the country and choose a place of
residence, particularly the right to move freely in and out of camps or other
settlements; the responsibility of the government to find the missing, identify
the dead, and reunite families; provision of essential services, such as food,
water, shelter, clothing, and medical services; government issuance of
documentation, including passports, personal identification documents, and
certificates; facilitation of any documents lost in the course of displacement,
which became particularly critical in Haiti’s election cycle; and the right of
IDPs, particularly children, to receive education that is free and compulsory at

69

Refugees and Migrants, AMNESTY INT’L (Oct. 3, 2007), http://www.amnesty.org/en/node/911.
U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., USAID ASSISTANCE TO INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS POLICY
(2004), available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/200mbc.pdf.
71 Id.; cf. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights, Further Promotion &
Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme and
Methods of Work of the Comm’n, Rep. of the Representative of the Sec’y-Gen., Francis M. Deng, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement].
72 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 71, at 9.
73 CLINTON GLOBAL INITIATIVE, CGI HAITI ACTION NETWORK WASH/SHELTER GROUP: ACTIVITY
REPORT JUNE 2011, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.haitiwater.org/sites/default/files/CGI_HAN_WASH_
Shelter_June_2011.pdf.
70
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the primary level, with consideration given to cultural identity, language, and
religion.74
The USG’s relief and development programs have been working with the
GOH and international community to address these rights. In addition to
providing food, shelter, water, and health care, the USG has worked to ensure
that other needs are also met.75 The USG has supported and provided training
to the Haitian National Police, who work with the UN Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (“MINUSTAH”) to provide security in the IDP settlements.76 In addition,
USAID has facilitated the flow of information through support to the GOH
communications ministry and the broadcast of the daily “News You Can Use”
radio show that relays essential information,77 such as hurricane notifications
and cholera-prevention messages.78 During the parliamentary and presidential
elections in November 2010, and the run-off elections in March 2011, the USG
supported campaigns that provided election materials in IDP camps.79 To
ensure that children could return to school, USAID supported rubble removal
and reconstruction at a number of Port-au-Prince-area schools.80 Also, to
ensure that IDPs have legal recourse, USAID continues to support the
provision of legal services through the local bar association.81
While recognizing the humanitarian imperative to provide support to IDPs,
USAID has learned that services must be made available on a broad scale to
communities, including both IDPs and non-IDPs, to avoid creating an
incentive for poor families to relocate to camps. The humanitarian needs of
IDPs must be addressed, but the ultimate goal must be to resettle them back to
normal community life. In addition, services such as provision of food, water,
and health care must not negatively impact the local private sector. For this
reason, USAID carefully monitors these services and reevaluates or realigns
programs to ensure that they do not do more harm than good.82 In Haiti, for
74

Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, supra note 71, at 5–13.
Obama, supra note 15.
76 USAID Post-earthquake Response: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 58.
77 OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES: HAITI, supra note 54, at 1.
78 U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, HAITI: HURRICANE TOMAS:
CHOLERA: SITUATION REPORT #14, at 5 (2010), http://haiti.humanitarianresponse.info/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=VcRxKvdrFXU%3d&tabid=91&mid=574.
79 The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, BETTER WORLD CAMPAIGN, http://www.betterworldcampaign.
org/un-peacekeeping/missions/haiti.html (last updated Aug. 2011).
80 See Haiti: One Year Later, supra note 18.
81 See generally U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., STRENGTHENING RULE OF LAW (2009), http://www.usaid.
gov/ht/docs/gjd/justice_fact_sheet_4_2009.pdf.
82 USAID Post-earthquake Response: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 58.
75

WEISENFELD GALLEYSFINAL2.DOC

2011]

3/20/2012 1:52 PM

SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES OF HAITI EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE

1113

instance, when staff monitoring revealed declines in local food prices, USAID
scaled general food distribution back and focused it on malnourished children
and pregnant and lactating mothers.83 Also, when it was clear that emergency
water needs were met, the USG slowly scaled back free water distribution and
supported local, private sector water suppliers to get back on their feet.84
C. Gender-Based Violence
One of the areas on which the USG is particularly focused is the prevention
of GBV. After the earthquake, reports of GBV increased, likely due in part to
living conditions in IDP camps that lacked adequate security and privacy, as
well as the breakdown of community norms from wide-scale displacement.85
To combat GBV, USAID established procedures to help protect at-risk women
and children:
As a first step, the U.S. Agency for International Development’s
(USAID) relief activities incorporated protection measures to
minimize risks for harm, exploitation, and abuse, including GBV. For
example, USAID’s partners ensured women’s access to food and
relief commodities and sought to locate water points and latrines in
safe locations. Wherever possible, USAID integrates measures in our
humanitarian programs that attempt to decrease the vulnerability of
86
women and girls to sexual and gender-based violence.

For example, the USG, in coordination with its partners, installed solar lights
in IDP camps and large communities because adequate lighting is critical to
preventing GBV in neighborhoods and IDP camps.87 Further, the USG
provided headlamps and solar lights for Haitian National Police (“HNP”) and
MINUSTAH to improve night patrols and public safety.88 The USG is also
committed to treating victims, educating men and women about the dangers
and realities of GBV, and ensuring that perpetrators are caught and
prosecuted.89 USAID’s programming follows the Guidelines for Gender-based

83

Id.
Id.
85 Gender-Based Violence Against Haitian Women & Girls in Internal Displacement Camps, MADRE
(Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.madre.org/index/press-room-4/news/gender-based-violence-against--haitianwomen--girls-in-internal-displacement-camps-611.html.
86 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., FAST FACTS ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S WORK IN HAITI: GENDER
BASED VIOLENCE (2011) [hereinafter GENDER BASED VIOLENCE] (on file with author).
87 USAID Post-earthquake Response: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 58.
88 Id.
89 See id.
84
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Violence Interventions in Humanitarian Settings.90 For example, USAID has
instituted programs to build the capacity and responsiveness of the Haiti
National Police to prevent and respond to GBV and provide support for
victims.91 In addition, the USG has trained 300 “brigadiers” to patrol IDP
camps to reduce GBV and human rights violations.92 USAID is working to
strengthen women’s groups and supporting messaging campaigns, including
“Stop the Rape” public service announcements aired during the World Cup.93
As USAID takes preventative measures, it is working to treat victims. In 2010,
USAID assisted 596 women and 513 child victims of GBV.94
Legal assistance programs for survivors of sexual violence are another key
part of reducing impunity for perpetrators and assisting survivors of sexual
violence in Haiti. For example, prior to the launch of a USAID legal assistance
project in the Artibonite region “in June 2009, not a single rape case in the area
was ever investigated and not a single aggressor was ever arrested for rape.”95
Through USAID’s partner organization, however, this program has led to the
issuance of 266 arrest warrants to date.96 “Of these, 200 settled out of court and
compensated their victims. Another 36 cases went to trial and 20 of the
perpetrators were sentenced to prison terms.”97
Research suggests that in the long run, the economic and social
empowerment of women may reduce the incidence of GBV.98 In addition to
medical, psychosocial, and legal assistance, USAID is providing livelihood
opportunities to survivors of sexual violence. USAID has helped women find
economic opportunities through microcredit services and microfinance
90 See INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE TASKFORCE ON GENDER IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE,
GUIDELINES FOR GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE INTERVENTIONS IN HUMANITARIAN SETTINGS: FOCUSING ON
PREVENTION OF AND RESPONSE TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN EMERGENCIES (2005), available at http://reliefweb.
int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/22843D7FE6B7842DC125709E00370AF1-iasc%20gbv.pdf.
91 See USAID Post-earthquake Response: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 58.
92 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., FAST FACTS ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S WORK IN HAITI: FUNDING 1
(2011), available at http://www.usaid.gov/ht/docs/eqdocs/usg_factsheets/USG_FUNDING_FINAL_EDITED.
pdf.
93 Three Things You Should Know About the U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti, U.S AGENCY FOR INT’L
DEV. (June 24, 2010), http://www.usaid.gov/helphaiti/documents/3things_100624.html.
94 GENDER BASED VIOLENCE, supra note 86, at 2.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Sarah Bott et al., Preventing and Responding to Gender-Based Violence in Middle and Low-Income
Countries: A Global Review and Analysis 6 (World Bank Pol’y Research, Working Paper No. 3618, June
2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID754927_code427206.pdf?abstractid=
754927&mirid=1.
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training.99 While economic opportunity by itself will not eliminate the
prevalence of GBV in Haiti, increased livelihood options may reduce the
vulnerability to and incidence of violence, particularly in combination with
behavioral change and awareness programs. Through these multifaceted
approaches to GBV, the USG is working to support an environment in which
Haitians, regardless of gender, have access to opportunity and equal protection.
D. Relief-to-Reconstruction Continuum
The efforts undertaken by USAID and other international donors will best
serve Haitians if there is a smooth, seamless transition from relief to long-term
reconstruction and development. USAID has broad legal authority for relief,
allowing for great flexibility and rapid response. However, the agency’s
authority for long-term development programming requires detailed planning
and open procurement.100 These different systems for determining the
allocation of resources require care and attention in managing the transition.
This is particularly true in a few sectors in Haiti: the transition from temporary
to permanent housing; the transition from cash-for-work (short-term,
temporary) employment to permanent jobs; and the provision of food aid in a
way that does not negatively affect local markets.101
The urgent need for shelter resulting from the earthquake required the rapid
provision of emergency materials before the broad picture was clear. A smooth
transition from emergency relief to long-term reconstruction would have been
facilitated by providing temporary shelters on land or adjacent to land where
permanent housing could be constructed. However, with many parts of Portau-Prince covered with rubble and an immediate need to shelter a million and a
half people from the elements, it was not possible to wait until land for
permanent housing could be identified; the situation required rapid action.
Additionally, donors began funding temporary housing solutions right away,
before it became apparent that much of the existing housing stock could be
repaired at relatively minimal cost.102 As a result, USAID and other donors

99 See Jim Luce, Fonkoze Helps Rebuild Haiti Through Microfinance Following Earthquake,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 15, 2010, 5:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-luce/fonkoze-helps-rebuildhai_b_499901.html.
100 See DEP’T OF STATE, POST-EARTHQUAKE USG STRATEGY TOWARD RENEWAL AND ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY 79–80 (2011) [hereinafter POST-EARTHQUAKE USG STRATEGY TOWARD RENEWAL AND
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156448.pdf.
101 Id. at 19, 37–39; Haiti: One Year Later, supra note 18.
102 See Haiti: One Year Later, supra note 18.
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shifted housing plans in light of new information as it became available.103
These examples highlight that disaster response often necessitates action with
only limited information, and the lack of full information may result in actions
taken in the short term that later do not allow for a seamless transition from
relief to reconstruction.
The transition from short-term, temporary jobs to permanent employment
also presented a challenge to managing the relief-to-reconstruction continuum.
Temporary employment has been tremendously beneficial in post-earthquake
Haiti, as it injected much-needed cash into the local economy, and was also an
easy means of involving unemployed Haitians in the rebuilding of their
nation.104 To date, USAID programs have employed more than 350,000
people, about half of whom are women, in short-term jobs, injecting more than
$19 million into the local economy.105 The UN’s job creation and food security
program is funding projects to repair thirteen irrigation systems, rebuild twelve
kilometers of rural roads, and assist in building 300 community and family
gardens.106
Because this kind of employment is short-term, publicly funded work,
however, it does not translate easily into permanent employment. For this
reason, donors are working on long-term employment solutions. The USG’s
economic growth programs are training Haitians in the construction,
agriculture, and garment industries—areas that can help Haiti strengthen its
economy for the long term.107 Within a year after the earthquake, two viable
long-term employment solutions were founded: the Haiti Apparel Center,
which will help grow the private sector workforce by training more than 2,000
professionals per year involved in the textile industry, including sewing
machine operators, mechanics, and quality-control supervisors;108 and the
Northern Industrial Park, which will supply up to 20,000 new jobs to people

103

Id.
POST-EARTHQUAKE USG STRATEGY TOWARD RENEWAL AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, supra note
100, at 37–39.
105 Fast Facts on U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti: Funding, U.S AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (Jan. 8, 2011),
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2011/154143.htm.
106 Haiti: UN Agency Funds Job Creation and Food Production Project, UN NEWS CENTRE (May 21,
2010), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=34772.
107 See Press Release, U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., New USAID-Funded Haiti Apparel Center to Provide
Training to Thousands of Haitians in the Garment Industry: Project Promotes Economic Opportunity and
Benefits of U.S. Trade Legislation (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2010/pr100811_1.
html.
108 Id.
104
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living in the Cap Haitien area in the north of the country.109 Together with the
GOH, international community, and private sector, the USG is working to
improve the business environment in Haiti.
Food aid is an area where the initial provision of assistance can make the
critical difference in saving lives, but monitoring its impact on local markets is
vital to ensure that it does not distort markets and thereby serve as a
disincentive to local production. Removing incentives for local farmers to
produce could increase dependence on humanitarian food commodities, which,
in the long run, could increase food insecurity.110 In the earthquake’s
immediate aftermath, USAID was the largest single donor of basic food
commodities,111 with USAID’s Office of Food for Peace contributing
approximately $140.6 million in emergency food aid programs implemented
by the United Nations World Food Program and NGOs.112 From January
through mid-April 2010, these partners reached nearly 4 million earthquakeaffected Haitians in and outside of Port-au-Prince via general food
distributions.113 Through a variety of local partners and the USG’s own staff,
the USG monitored prices on the local market to determine when the food
supply in Haiti was sufficiently robust as to cause a downward trend in retail
prices for staple foods (e.g., rice, corn, oil), which would have the impact of
reducing the incentive for farmers to plant. After about thirteen weeks of
general food distribution, when market monitoring revealed a decrease in
prices, the GOH led donors in scaling back food distribution to focus on the
most vulnerable populations (e.g., under-five and malnourished children,
pregnant and lactating mothers, the disabled), so as to avoid negatively
impacting farming livelihoods.114 This more targeted food assistance reached
1.9 million people nationwide.115 At the same time, the USG scaled up
assistance to farmers, providing improved seeds, fertilizer, and technical
advice to facilitate increased local production and lessen the country’s
109 Bureau of W. Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, North Industrial Park in Haiti: Fact Sheet,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 11, 2011), http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2011/154278.htm.
110 DEPUTY ADM’R, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., FOOD AID AND FOOD SECURITY POLICY PAPER 11
(1995), available at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/foodsec/foodsec.pdf.
111 FINTRAC INC., USAID OFFICE OF FOOD FOR PEACE: HAITI MARKET ANALYSIS 3 (2010), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/ffp/haitiannex.pdf
112 Fast Fact on U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti: Food Security Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan.
8, 2011), http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2011/154149.htm.
113 Haiti, WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, http://www.wfp.org/countries/haiti (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).
114 USAID Post-earthquake Response: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 58.
115 FAST FACTS ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S WORK IN HAITI 2 (2011), http://www.usaid.gov/ht/docs/
eqdocs/usg_factsheets/USG_relief_to_reconstruction.pdf.
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dependence on food aid.116 As the situation stabilized and market availability
of food produced locally increased, the USG evolved its program by
supplementing in-kind food assistance with cash and food vouchers that could
be used to buy food on local markets, further stimulating production by
Haitians.117
CONCLUSION: TOWARD LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT
There are many lessons to be learned from the relief and ongoing
reconstruction effort in Haiti, which has drawn the attention and participation
of many nations around the world. For the USG, the Haitian experience
represents a complex emergency that can serve as a guide for future efforts
worldwide. USAID has the legal mandate to lead the USG’s humanitarian
response. Effective leadership requires flexibility and institutionalizing the
relative roles and responsibilities of different agencies that may become
involved in responding to a major disaster. The more efficient targeting of
humanitarian resources can be aided by greater standardization of
methodologies and reporting tools for the collection and analysis of data used
by different humanitarian actors.
Long-term reconstruction work in Haiti will have to grapple with a number
of complex challenges for many years to come, including land tenure, the
plight of IDPs, the problems of GBV, and managing the smooth transition of
programs along the relief-to-reconstruction continuum.
The ultimate goals of USG assistance are to work more quickly, efficiently,
and effectively; provide solutions that can benefit the host country and
translate into long-term development gains; and improve the quality of life for
those it serves. In Haiti, this means the USG is working collaboratively with
the international community to implement a reconstruction agenda that will
move the country forward. This agenda is enacted through a robust and
ambitious long-term development strategy that focuses on four strategic pillars.
These four pillars are areas in which the USG can add significant value and
generate results that align with the GOH plan for the reconstruction of Haiti.

116

Id.
Press Release, U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., U.S. Embassy Announces Groundbreaking Effort to
Provide Emergency Food Assistance to Earthquake Victims in Haiti: Two New Grants Utilize Cash and Food
Vouchers To Complement In-Kind Food Aid (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2010/
pr100813.html.
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Together with its partners, the USG will focus on agricultural productivity to
strengthen food and economic security; improving infrastructure, including
housing and electricity; healthcare and other essential services, like education;
and governance, rule of law, and security.
Overcoming Haiti’s deep challenges will require innovative solutions. For
example, Haiti’s agriculture production in rice and other crops has been
decreasing since the 1950s, and the challenges have increased over time.118
Although sixty percent of Haitians work in the agriculture sector, the country
still struggles to feed itself;119 fifty-one percent of all food is imported.120
While Haiti did import less food in the past, most of the increased food imports
are driven by a yearly population growth that is currently much higher than
what its resource base can support.121 Through innovations like vertical
farming, which maximizes space, allowing farmers to plant more crops in
smaller areas and dramatically increase yields, USAID is providing an
opportunity for Haitians to become a more stable, prosperous society. And,
because nobody knows where the next innovation will come from, the USG is
establishing funds to challenge people to develop their own innovative
solutions.
This monetary incentive for innovation is already working in Haiti, where
the Mobile Money Initiative is introducing new uses for existing technology.
USAID partnered with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to develop the
initiative, which awarded its first-to-market prize to cell phone carrier Digicel
in January 2011.122 Mobile banking will make it easier for Haitians to access
savings accounts and other financial services. In a country where ninety
percent of the population never had access to financial services, sending,
receiving, and storing money through mobile phones can reduce the risks and
costs of financial transactions; help increase savings; and generate

118 FED. RESEARCH DIV., LIBRARY OF CONG., HAITI: A COUNTRY STUDY (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 2001),
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/httoc.html (follow “Agriculture” hyperlink).
119 Fast Facts on the U.S. Government’s Work in Haiti: Food Security Fact Sheet, supra note 112.
120 Jonathan M. Katz, With Cheap Food Imports, Haiti Can’t Feed Itself, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20,
2010, 2:13 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/20/with-cheap-food-imports-h_n_507228.html.
121 See CARIBBEAN COUNTRY MGMT. UNIT, WORLD BANK, HAITI: SOCIAL RESILIENCE AND STATE
FRAGILITY IN HAITI: A COUNTRY SOCIAL ANALYSIS, at i (2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/SOCIALANALYSIS/1104894-1115795935771/20938696/Haiti_CSA.pdf.
122 Press Release, U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., Gates Foundation and U.S. Government Give $2.5 Million
Prize for Transforming Banking Sector in Haiti: Mobile Operator Digicel Becomes First Recipient of Mobile
Money Fund in Haiti (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2011/pr110110.html.

WEISENFELD GALLEYSFINAL2.DOC

1120

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

3/20/2012 1:52 PM

[Vol. 25

employment.123 The Mobile Money Initiative will also help Haitians manage
payments to difficult-to-access vital services like banking, insurance, and
utilities.
This is a pivotal moment for Haiti, which now faces a long process of
recovery and rebuilding from the tragedy of the earthquake. Although it is a
time of uncertainty, caused by earthquake-related challenges, significant delays
in completing the elections, and the outbreak of cholera, it is also a time of
great hope. As a long-term partner with broad and longstanding historical and
cultural ties to Haiti, the United States is committed to helping the Haitian
people build back better. As the USG works with the Haitian people and their
government, the overriding factor that will determine success over the long
haul is whether Haitian institutions are equipped to propel their own
development.
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See id.

